This
background explains the original conflict within the independence movement between
Xanana and Mauk Moruk or Paulino Gama that took place in in 1984-5 during the
Indonesian occupation, after which Gama came under the control of the
Indonesian military. He has lived in exile ever since, mostly in Holland. He returned
to Timor-Leste recently and established a Revolutionary Council calling for a
new government in TL. His recent actions have created a national dialogue on
these historical events. Gama’s motivations appear to be recognition of his
historical role and ideological position and translating that into a modern
power-base in contemporary Timorese politics although he appears to
have been gained little traction.
The
“Hudi Laran Reaction” and “Radical
Remodelling” (Mid-end 1984)
There was little doubt the planned national
uprising had ended in disaster and the resistance was in an even worse position
than ever. Civilian morale had plummeted and many felt the same lack of hope
they had after President Lobato’s death in 1978.
Xanana must have been haunted by accusations of a lack of judgement leading to
the crushing civilian reprisals. Along with his rethinking of political
ideology during the ceasefire, these pressures gave him pause to think
intensely about the future of the resistance. A conviction began to harden that
a political solution rather than a military one was the answer and, for that,
the entire political direction of the struggle needed to be changed. After
being able to pull off the March 1981 re-organisation, his leadership underwent
its second great test.
Xanana made the point that his consultations
concerning pluralism during the ceasefire were cut short by Murdani’s ultimatum
in May 1983.
The unrelenting Indonesian military pressure since that time had allowed no
time to overcome any differences over the ceasefire and the disastrous
uprising, leading to further discord within Falintil. Although much of the
following events are little documented, it is known that an internal coup was
attempted by Chief-of-Staff of Falintil, Commander Kilik, supported by his
Deputy and Chief of the Red Brigades, Mauk-Moruk (Paulino Gama), and others.Both men, known to be loyal to
original Fretilin policies and fierce military commanders and fighters, had had
little to do with the uprising in the East. They had been reporting
‘successful’ military operations in the Central Zone direct back to DFSE in
Lisbon, suggesting Kilik was bypassing Xanana’s Command and liaising directly
with Fretilin externally.
In May 1984 Xanana was staying at a camp on
Mt. Matebian and was in communication with resistance groups throughout the
territory (Key E; Map 3.1).
I was receiving many, many messages from
soldiers and commanders telling me that they were inactive …while in other
places they [ABRI] were scared. In the Centre East Falintil was very inactive,
while in Ainaro and Same they tried to attack the enemy. I thought something
must be wrong. Many companies during 1984 were just talking and talking.
Falur’s people had been requesting operations but nothing ever eventuated. One
platoon returned to their village frustrated because they had no leadership. It
made other companies in the area frustrated because they kept hearing about
attacks in other areas that captured weapons and killed enemy soldiers. In my
messages, one year after Kraras, I kept warning them, trying to inspire them to
do something, to engage in combat, to make some plans, but I had no effect.
Kilik, Moruk and Olo Gari, based in the
Centre East, were not usually inactive. Xanana was aware of a problem.
In the middle of 1984 Xanana released his
message for the year, a long contemplative piece titled, ‘What is National
Unity?’ addressed directly to the DFSE. To them he signed off only as Commander
in Chief of Falintil.[6] It
opened with a reference to the lack of political unity amongst the East
Timorese apparent since April 1974. Although the message still promoted
Fretilin, it called for an enlargement of the Front. He offered nationalists
two choices, either join Fretilin, “a liberation movement gathering together
all nationalists without discrimination on grounds of colour, sex, age,
political belief or religious faith or social conditions”, or the establishment
of something new, “a common platform for national independence”, which could
include other nationalists. He acknowledged for the first time that there were
Timorese, “unwilling to belong to a Movement or Party”. He declared what was
important was that everyone be moved by a common feeling—that of national
identity and that this should underlay the “deep meaning of National Unity as
defined by Fretilin”.
Fretilin therefore wants to give other
political groups the possibility of participating in a mutually compatible way,
in the struggle… we need to add to the Armed Front other fronts of resistance,
in the political and diplomatic fields. Fretilin therefore calls for National Unity…
Fretilin calls for struggle on all fronts. It is in that sense we call for the
“enlargement of the front”—for the formation of one and only powerful
resistance front against Indonesian occupation, that unites all nationalist
movements for a total attack on the various fields of struggle: the armed,
political and diplomatic.
He even advocated a provisional government
be established. The message also included information some guerrillas were no
doubt highly sensitive to, that of the internal arrests and “suffering” caused
by Fretilin during the 1975 civil war and the first three years of the
occupation. Although he named Alaríco Fernandes as a criminal and recognised
these events as ‘sectarian errors that must eventually be dealt with’, he
advocated an understanding of the ‘concrete conditions in which they occurred’.
Xanana wrote, “Fretilin in the past had an
extremist policy indeed; but from what it has learnt, a new political opening
will allow the participation of other nationalist movements.” He promised that
Fretilin would guarantee freedom of expression and opposed use of force. His
approach to ‘integrationists’ and ‘collaborators’ had also softened. He
wrote that, “Fretilin has learnt from its mistakes. Today we have in our ranks
the Secret Resistance, composed of Integrationist, ex-Apodeti and also many who
have collaborated with the enemy”, declaring that even Mário Carrascalão would
be welcomed! Xanana had obviously been in contact with such people during the
ceasefire period and had embraced a new philosophy of reconciliation that was
anathema to the old Fretilin hierarchy.
Another significant departure was an
insistence that political negotiation and diplomatic representation be on an
equal footing with the armed struggle. While addressing these issues Xanana had
been avidly listening to Radio Australia, following news of an unwelcome change
in Australian policy on Timor. He
mentioned the importance of regional stability and respecting Indonesian and
Australian interests, finally talking the language of international diplomacy.
The reality of the situation must have
allowed for little true consultation on these fundamental issues. For some the
changes were too sudden, the new policies too sweeping and many resisted the changes he insisted
on. However, Xanana, as was his style, looked not to these obstacles but
forward, sure of his vision for the new resistance, dragging those in the
resistance behind him.
At the time the message was released in the
middle of 1984, Xanana made the difficult journey across the cordon and headed
south, arriving at Liaruca once again, in June (Key F; Map 3.1). He went to
assess the problems reported from the Central Zone and co-ordinate the
commanders there. He invited Central Committee members and commanders to a meeting
and sent out Taur Matan Ruak to bring them. He received messages informing him
that “Mauk Moruk and the other members were meeting, north of Barique” in an
area called, Hudi Laran, ‘Banana Tree
Forest’ (Key G; Map 3.1).
They knew that I was coming to reprimand
them and so they refused to send a courier to collect me. Around June and July
we waited and waited for them to come. Matan Ruak came to me in Liaruka and
told me about their mistakes and errors, the incapacity of their command,
strategy and planning, and that they had dispersed refusing to talk to me. Mauk
Moruk had gone to Same and Kilik to Fata Balu. I found out later that they had
called me a revolutionary traitor at the Hudi
Laran meeting because of my discussions about pluralism with them during
the ceasefire, but they were only saying this about me to avoid my criticism of
their military strategies, so they condemned me in a political way. They said
that although they considered me a nationalist who could be accepted as part of
the resistance, I was changing the fundamental ideology, which I was. They
considered themselves the true revolutionaries, the inheritors of our
predecessors. They dispersed to persuade other companies in the southwest of
their opinion saying that I was changing things and maybe I had been corrupted
during the ceasefire conversations. Mauk Moruk-Paulino Gama was trying to
persuade the military commander, and Lere, the Political Commissar, a member of
the Central Committee in Ainaro-Same.
Later Xanana explained more about this time,
citing a lack of commitment to duty amongst these leaders. He explained that an
organization cannot be measured by its structure but its individual agents and
their level of responsibility and commitment.
Xanana accused many of being complacent and unresponsive to the new
requirements of the struggle, self-satisfied with their positions and unwilling
to develop the organization. He decided to shake-up the Command. Growing tired
of waiting for a response he called a ‘Reorganisation Meeting’ in Liaruca in
September 1984.
I was in contact with the company commanders
in the Centre East and many other political cadres and I felt that we could not
wait for much longer because we needed to start preparing the forces for
action. In September I held a meeting on the south coast between the Dilor
River and the Luka River. I called on Kilik, Moruk, all company commanders and
political cadres from the Centre East to come to this meeting. Matan Ruak met
some who said they would come but they did not turn up. Kilik said, ‘Yes,’ but
never came either and instead went to Same to meet Mauk Moruk, trying to
persuade the commanders there that I was a traitor.
Xanana emphasised the lack of military will
of Kilik and Moruk, but his view of them is not reflected elsewhere. Kilik and
Moruk were well-known as a fierce Commanders and it maybe that it was
opposition to Xanana’s leadership and political reforms that led to the
military stalemate.
On 4 September, a resolution was passed at
Liaruca to restructure the military command completely, along with the “radical
remodelling” of CRRN and the Fretilin Central Committee. Kilik and Mauk Moruk
along with three others were expelled from the Fretilin Central Committee
because they attempted “to stir up the forces who renounced them as the Central
Committee of Hudi Laran”. As
Commander-in-Chief Xanana also declared himself Falintil’s Chief of Staff. He
believed that the pressing “situation of war” dictated this.
The restructure removed both the rebel’s political and military authority.
Xanana
described the actual “reaction” or coup attempt.
The Hudi
Laran Group started to complain and cause problems, telling people loudly
that, ‘Xanana is a traitor…’ The reaction started to become obvious and in that
way it became known as ‘The Reaction of 1984’ lead by Mauk and Kilik. It
concluded when Kilik committed suicide because their actions and political
accusations were not accepted. He shot himself because of psychological
problems. He was the sort of man who could keep revenge repressed, who could
not recognize his errors and mistakes.
António Campos stated he was part of the
mixed platoon of representatives from all three military regions, which Xanana
sent to disarm the rebels. Campos said Kilik disappeared and Moruk discovered,
“he had no support…. [and] managed to escape with four guns and then finally
surrendered to the Indonesians.”
Other guerrilla commanders reported that Kilik was killed in a battle with
Indonesian forces.
This purge of hardliners by Xanana can be seen as the beginning of his
longer-term split with Fretilin.
I myself created a Marxist-Leninist party,
transforming the Fretilin movement into a party [in 1981], but very soon I
realised that the ideology did not serve us. So we changed our previous
thinking and enabled Fretilin to regain its former nationalist character… If
you ask me what my political philosophy is, [it is] only the liberation of my
country.
He had given up the rhetoric of revolution,
of which he was never truly convinced, in favour of his own vision of the
nationalist liberation of the Homeland and the People, who would then be free
to choose their own political beliefs.
Amongst the harsh decisions and actions required of a
guerrilla Commander in the midst of a bloody war there was a more spiritual
side to Xanana’s leadership emerging. Sometime in 1984, a major transformation
occurred to his spiritual beliefs. Not since his epiphany in a mountain hut
just after the invasion had the power and strength of the Timorese sacred world
touched him so deeply. He had always protested this world was slavish Timorese
superstition, however, in 1984, he
witnessed a “miracle” after a battle.
I saw men with clothes
and rucksacks with bullet holes but the men had not even been grazed. The
bullets had passed through their bodies without hurting a single life cell of
their being. And I saw other such things.
I realized my mistake and
started to defend the use of talismans. I conducted a study of the talismans of
which there were many kinds. In essence a woman’s presence is in opposition to
the talisman, taking all supernatural power, and the capacity to armour the
body against bullets. For that reason the basic rule is the prohibition of
contact with women….
Amazing things happen
that are difficult to believe! As you can see these events ‘affected’ me into
believing the total opposite. Fundamentally I just let myself embrace these
beliefs for practical considerations. I did not have the capacity to guarantee
that my men were not exterminated and we all needed that ‘protection’ to
continue our existence, to carry on the armed resistance.
Xanana explained that it was only during war that he came into contact with the
mythological thought of the Timorese and he grew to understand how it sustained
them. Their mythology and culture was part of their
identity, which manifested itself in a modern political sense as the basis of
their nationalism.
With this new perspective Xanana enhanced the Timorese nationalist term,
Maubere, with a greater cultural and spiritual depth.
After ten years living in the mountains the only thing that
made sense was the belief system that radiated from them. Xanana became
profoundly connected with the sacred ancestral land of Timor, the lulik rai. He had come to believe that,
“what links the people with the land, the elements of earth, stone, of water
and air, is the reason they could fight on, the reason they could give their
lives for their country.”
Faced with the most fundamental
issues of life and death and survival as a people Xanana opened his heart up to
a belief system able to sustain him spiritually and mentally.
